Comparative constitutional design
Type de document | Site actuel | Cote | Statut | Date de retour prévue | Code à barres | Réservations |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Livre | La bibliothèque des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et de Gestion | 342 GIN (Parcourir l'étagère) | Disponible | 0000000022974 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution making / Jon Elster -- Does the process of constitutional-making matter? / Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg -- Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions : power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy / Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw, and Barry R. Weingast -- The origins of parliamentary responsibility / Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian, and Anjali Thomas Bohlken -- Social foundations of China's living constitution / Randall Peerenboom -- The political economy of constitutionalism in a non-secularist world / Ran Hirschl -- Constitutional amendment rules : the denominator problem / Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden -- Collective-action federalism : a general theory of Article I, Section 8 / Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel -- Personal laws and equality : the case of India / Martha C. Nussbaum -- Constitutional adjudication, Italian style / John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino -- Tyrannophobia / Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele -- Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? / Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James Melton.
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